Objective: To investigate the effects of Medicare's Prospective Payment System (PPS) for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and associated rate changes on quality of care as represented by staffing ratios and regulatory deficiencies. Study Design: A difference-in-difference model was used to assess effects of PPS and BBRA on staffing and deficiencies, a design that allows the separation of the effects of the policies from general trends. Ordinary least squares and negative binomial models were employed.
Introduction
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 mandated the largest decrease in payments for nursing residents covered by Medicare since 1965. The BBA fundamentally changed the way Medicare pays skilled nursing facilities for the 9 percent of residents covered by Medicare. The new system, which began in 1998, paid nursing homes on a prospective basis instead of through a retrospective cost-based system. Nursing homes were paid a fixed amount per day, with adjustments for health status, but no additional payments for additional services. Like most prospective systems, the goals were to reduce the rapid growth in spending while not decreasing quality of care.
Since the new system was implemented in 1998, the media have repeatedly reported that skilled nursing facilities are experiencing financial difficulties. Total Medicare payments to skilled nursing facilities fell in the year after prospective payments were introduced. Over 10 percent of facilities nationwide have filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Roadman, 2000) , including many of the largest chains (e.g., Vencor, Genesis Health Ventures, Mariner Post-Acute Network, Integrated Health Services, Sun Healthcare Group). There are substantial concerns that the change in payment system, combined with a reduction in total payments, may have reduced the quality of care.
We examine the effects of PPS and subsequent rate changes on two measures of nursing home quality of care. The first is a process-based measurestaffing hours per resident-day.
Staffing has been shown to have a direct effect on resident outcomes, especially professional staffing (Cohen and Spector, 1996; Castle, 2000; Harrington et al., 2000; Johnson-Pawlson, 1996) and has received significant media attention in recent years. The second measure of quality is the number of regulatory deficiencies cited in Medicare and Medicaid re-certification surveys. Each nursing facility that is certified for either Medicaid or Medicare is surveyed by a state agency at least once every 15 months to check for compliance with regulations on care practices and management. A nursing facility is cited with a deficiency if surveyors find the facility out of compliance with any one of several hundred individual requirements. These deficiencies are recorded in the Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) database used in our analysis. Deficiencies, like many other commonly used measures of quality, are imperfect proxies, but they do give an indication of changes in resident outcomes that cannot be gleaned from analysis of staffing alone.
Our study focuses on how changes in Medicare reimbursement affect quality of care by comparing staffing and deficiencies in skilled nursing homes before and after the implementation of PPS. We allow for differences between for-profit and nonprofit nursing homes, and use a difference-in-difference design to separate the effects of payment changes from concurrent trends in the industry. Furthermore, in contrast to some other studies, we view the nursing facility as a whole, with revenue streams from one type of resident potentially affecting quality of care for all residents. The results show that nursing homes respond to Medicare rate cuts with lower professional staffing and more deficiencies, and to rate increases with higher staffing and fewer deficiencies.
Background
Between 1986 and 1998, skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) became the fastest-growing segment of Medicare expenditures, growing at an average of 30 percent per year nominally (US GAO, 1999) . Skilled nursing facilities were reimbursed under a retrospective cost-based system, with limits on routine costs but no limits on ancillary services such as physical and occupational therapy. Although the growth was due in part to a large increase in the number of Medicare beneficiaries utilizing SNF services (an 80 percent increase between 1990 and 1997 alone according to the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission, 1997), the system was widely seen as encouraging excessive use of ancillary therapies while providing few incentives for cost containment. In response, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) mandated the implementation of a PPS for skilled nursing facilities.
In accordance with the BBA, the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA), now the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), began a phased-in implementation of a perdiem Medicare PPS for skilled nursing facilities in July 1998. Retrospective, cost-based reimbursement was replaced with prospective per diem rates for each Medicare resident, regardless of the actual costs incurred by the facility. The case-mix categories used for differential reimbursement are based on the 44 groups in the Resource Utilization Group III (RUG-III) system (Fries, et al., 1994) . Each Medicare resident must be clinically assessed within the first five days of admission to the facility; based on results of the assessment, the resident is classified into one of the 44 case-mix categories with an associated PPS rate. Regular assessments are required to ensure that residents are re-classified into appropriate case-mix categories as their conditions improve or deteriorate. The facility is responsible for providing appropriate care efficiently and is not reimbursed for costs incurred beyond the PPS rate.
The SNF PPS system was phased in over four years, with the start of each year corresponding to a facility's own fiscal year. In the first year, facilities were reimbursed based on 25 percent federal rate and 75 percent facility-specific rate. A 50/50 mix was used in the second year, 75/25 in the third year, and finally 100 percent of the federal rate in the fourth year.
Rates were designed based on average costs per case-mix category in 1995; each facility's 1995 costs determined the facility-specific rate and the average cost over all facilities determined the federal rate, updated for inflation. Adjustments are made for regional wage differences and rural status.
PPS was not intended to be budget-neutral. A major goal of the change to prospective rates was to slow the growth in Medicare SNF costs. Therefore, PPS rates were set to decrease average reimbursements for the overwhelming majority of facilities, with total savings in 1999 estimated ex-ante by the Congressional Budget Office at $1.2 billion; instead, expenditures were cut by $3.4 billion in 1999, more than double the intended amount (The Lewin Group, 2000) . Concerns over the industry's financial viability led Congress and HCFA to reconsider the adequacy of the rates until the RUG-III system can be revised or replaced.
Congress enacted adjustments to the system in the Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of April 2000, slightly increasing the federal rates in all RUG-III groups and by 20 percent in 15 of the groups thought to be under-reimbursed. The adjustments were seen as a temporary solution, scheduled to end when an improved classification system was developed.
The BBRA also allowed facilities with lower facility-specific rates to move to the full federal rate with the start of the next cost reporting period rather than following the four-year phase-in.
Additional adjustments to the system were enacted in the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA). BIPA provisions (all starting April 1, 2001) affecting SNF PPS included a small overall increase in rates to adjust for inflation; an increase of 16.66 percent in the nursing component of the federal rate; the elimination of the 20 percent BBRA increase for three rehabilitation RUG categories; and a 6.7 percent increase for all rehabilitation RUG categories. BIPA provisions are not considered in our analysis due to data limitations.
Traditionally, Medicare has been responsible for only a small portion of nursing facility residents and revenues. Medicare only pays for 100 days of nursing facility care and only after at least a three-day hospital stay; after the 20 th day a large copayment is required. On average, Medicare is responsible for only nine percent of nursing facility residents, comprising approximately 12 percent of total nursing facility revenues (AHCA, 2001) . During the last decade, however, acuity levels in nursing facilities have been rising. Many facilities have increased capacity to care for Medicare residents. In part, this may have been an effort to increase Medicare revenues to supplement the relatively lower Medicaid rates associated with the majority of residents in most facilities. Thus, despite the small proportion of Medicare residents in the average facility, the financial changes brought about by PPS are by no means trivial to skilled nursing facilities.
Evidence from the Literature
Two related areas of research offer a rich variety of literature with which to start: the effects of Medicare PPS on quality of care for hospital inpatient stays, and the effects of Medicaid case-mix reimbursement on quality of care in nursing facilities. A change to prospective payment for hospitals may lead to two kinds of incentives (Cutler, 1995; Norton, et al., 2002) . The change in marginal price from fee-for-service to zero should decrease quality of care because each additional treatment will increase the nursing home's cost without increasing revenue. However, it does not follow that quality of care will necessarily decrease. Feder and Scanlon (1989) found that the case-mix system implemented in Maryland resulted in no readily measurable declines in quality. The analysis was basically descriptive, with nursing care expenditures serving as an input-based proxy for quality before and after implementation of the new system. Some facilities were found to increase nursing care expenditures and some were found to decrease them, with no overall pattern emerging.
Likewise, Schlenker (1991) found no definitive quality patterns when comparing outcomes (catheter use, urinary tract infections, pressure ulcers, psychotropic drugs, confusion, and physical restraints) in states with case-mix versus other types of reimbursement systems. He used cross-sectional data collected for the study from 7 states and conducted 2-sample tests of mean differences for states with different payment systems, finding some differences but no general patterns. Viewed even within the context of the specific states studied in these two analyses, no general conclusions can be drawn as to the effects of prospective case-mix reimbursement for Medicaid residents on quality of care in nursing facilities. Norton (1992) analyzed data from a social experiment to test the effectiveness of a prospective payment system in improving the health of nursing home residents and Medicaid expenditures. He used a Markov model to represent the resulting health changes of nursing home residents to show that the monetary incentives had beneficial effects on both the quality and the cost of nursing home care.
The state-based studies of the effects of Medicaid case-mix or prospective reimbursement on quality leave many gaps in the research as far as assessing the potential effects of SNF PPS.
These studies have limited generalizability because they used data from one or two states from many years ago. They do not consider spillover effects to other residents. The control for the Medicaid studies was the system in place before case-mix reimbursement was introduced. Thus, changes in quality under case-mix reimbursement in Maryland and New York were measured relative to quality under flat-rate or class-rate systems, which is not the appropriate comparison group for SNF PPS. The statistical methods were often only descriptive.
Another segment of the literature on Medicaid reimbursement and quality of care concerns the effect of Medicaid rate increases in the presence of excess demand. In fact, most of the studies described above assume an excess demand framework, where facilities have a great deal of choice in which residents to accept or reject, Medicaid residents are accepted last, and
Medicaid demand exceeds supply. Excess demand is often associated with Certificate-of-Need (CON) laws present in most states, which restrict the number of nursing facility beds as a costcontainment measure. Following the lead of Scanlon (1980) , researchers found that an increase in Medicaid rates can lead to actual declines in quality (Nyman, 1985; Gertler, 1989) where excess demand exists. Using regulatory deficiencies as a proxy for quality and the return-oncapital portion of the Medicaid rate as an exogenous representation of the rate, Nyman showed that lower quality was associated with higher Medicaid reimbursement rates under excess demand in Wisconsin. The excess demand paradigm posits that nursing facilities compete on quality for private-pay residents and accept Medicaid residents only when the marginal revenue from an additional private-pay resident drops below the Medicaid rate. If the Medicaid rate is increased, nursing facilities have less incentive to compete for more private pay residents, so overall quality decreases. Most of the data used in the excess demand literature are also from the 1980s.
Recent studies have established that current market conditions no longer support the excess demand framework in most areas. Even where CON laws still exist, they are often not binding. Occupancy rates have been in steady decline since the mid-1990s (American Health Care Association, 2001), forcing facilities to compete for all types of residents. Cohen and Spector (1996) , using nationally representative data, found no effect of Medicaid reimbursement on outcomes that would support the excess demand theory. Grabowski (2001a) used national OSCAR data from 1995-96 to find that an increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates improved quality as measured by professional staffing regardless of CON laws, refuting the applicability of the excess demand literature today. Other measures of quality (regulatory deficiencies, nonprofessional staffing, medical error rate, use of catheters, feeding tubes, and physical restraints) led to inconclusive results but did not support the excess demand paradigm. In a related study (Grabowski, 2001b) , the same OSCAR data was supplemented with New York cost report data and a more outcomes-oriented measure of quality was used, the percent of residents with facility-acquired pressure sores. Rates were found to have a small but statistically significant and positive effect on quality, again refuting the excess demand results using more current data.
These newer studies of Medicaid reimbursement offer substantive and methodological insights as to the potential effects of Medicare reimbursement changes in nursing facilities in a competitive market. In the context of this analysis they are limited, however, by the focus on Medicaid. While Medicaid residents have generally been considered the least desirable residents due to low rates and yet comprise the majority of residents, Medicare residents have usually been considered a highly desirable minority. Effects on quality across all residents may therefore be very different for changes in payment for these two populations. Thus, although the literature on
Medicaid rates, Medicaid case-mix and prospective systems in nursing facilities offer a starting point, they clearly leave a gap to be filled if the effects of SNF PPS on quality of care are to be understood.
The research that addresses SNF PPS directly is still quite limited. There has been much discussion in the media and in the government about the effects of PPS on SNF financial margins and stability. There has also been some discussion as to whether or not PPS has led to decreased access to care for some Medicare beneficiaries, i.e., whether facilities are changing case-mix in response to the system and rejecting high-cost Medicare patients. There has been increasing discussion but little actual research, however, of the effect on outcomes. One study found no changes in rehospitalization rates of a subset of Medicare residents before and after PPS (Angelelli et al., 2002) , but the study was limited to Ohio nursing facilities through only the first six months of 1999 and did not include effects on other types of residents.
In sum, this study fills an important gap and adds to research in the field in several ways:
It assesses the behavior of nursing facilities facing changes in Medicare reimbursement, which may differ significantly from behavior in response to changes in Medicaid; it addresses the important and timely policy question of whether PPS and BBRA affect quality of care in nursing homes; it looks at the nursing facility as a whole and includes potential effects on non-Medicare residents; and it uses a design and econometric methods that enable identification of the effects of SNF PPS separately from other trends in the industry.
Methods
Conceptual Framework. There are two reasons why nursing facilities would be expected to lower quality of care after the implementation of PPS. One is the change to zero marginal payments for increases in treatment. The other is the decrease in average payments per day. The change to the prospective system gives an incentive to minimize costs, which should make facilities more efficient (the intended effect) but could also give an incentive to decrease quality in order to minimize costs. The funding cut results in a separate pathway by which quality may decrease, that of facilities having fewer resources. Thus, quality is expected to decrease due to PPS and increase again due to the BBRA rate increases. The two different rate changes allow for us to separately identify the effect of changes in average prices from marginal prices.
These incentives apply to both for-profit and nonprofit facilities, although the majority of facilities are for-profit (Norton, 2000) . Our study also allows for the possibility, however, that the magnitude of the incentive effects may differ by proprietary status. Nonprofit health care
organizations are often assumed to incorporate in their mission goals other than profit maximization, such as serving the poor (Sloan, 2000) . In nursing facilities, it is often assumed that nonprofit facilities care about and provide a higher level of quality than for-profit facilities, as found by Chou (2002) . Nonprofits must still be concerned with staying in operation, however, and may behave similarly to for-profits if financial viability is at stake. Although the directions of the incentives are the same for both for-profit and nonprofit facilities, in our empirical work observations in the original data set, only 140 observations were excluded because they were missing the fiscal year starting date, a key variable determining whether or not the facility was under the prospective payment system at any point in time. In addition, 5,378 observations with data deemed to be erroneous for key variables were excluded according to the criteria used by CMS in its report to Congress on staffing (CMS, 2000) . Criteria for deletion of a survey were:
facilities reporting more residents than beds; facilities reporting no RN hours and 60 or more beds; facilities reporting more than 12 RN hours per resident day; facilities reporting less than 0.5 total hours per resident day; and facilities reporting zero residents. hours worked per resident-day, derived from OSCAR variables. The number of regulatory deficiencies is defined as an unweighted count of deficiencies recorded in OSCAR. Since CMS surveyors score each deficiency according to scope and severity, it is possible in theory to assign weights representing the relative importance of deficiencies; however, because the process is inherently subjective and no standard weighting scheme has been accepted, a straightforward count was deemed most appropriate for this analysis. A description of all variables in the analysis, including dependent and explanatory variables, can be found in Table 1 .
[ by an indicator variable in the analysis, with nonprofit, independent, freestanding facilities serving as reference categories. The number of beds in the facility is defined continuously and controls for differences in staffing and deficiencies that can be attributed to size or economies of scale. The percent of residents that are private-pay serves as a proxy for non-Medicare resources in the facility, since private-pay residents generally bring in higher profit margins than Medicaid residents. Finally, the level of care available in the facility and the resident case-mix inevitably affect the need for staffing and risk of deficiencies. Thus, the outcomes of interest are riskadjusted through the inclusion of a measure of average functional dependence (ADL index), an indicator of whether ventilator care is available, a measure of other skilled services provided (skilled services index), and percents of residents with depression, psychiatric diagnoses, and dementia. The ADL index is constructed as an average of the percent of residents who are bedfast or chairbound or need assistance with eating, toileting, and transferring, weighted by the amount of assistance needed. The skilled services index is a sum of the percentages of residents utilizing intravenous therapy, suctioning, respiratory therapy, tracheostomy care, and parenteral feeding.
County economic and demographic factors may affect demand for a facility's services as well as the facility's ability to attract and retain staff. If facilities compete on the basis of quality, facilities in more competitive areas may maintain higher quality than those in low-competition areas. Competition among nursing homes is measured by a standard Herfindahl Index, defined as sum of the squared market shares of all homes in a county. A high-competition county is defined by a Herfindahl less than .12, and a low-competition county by a score greater than .5.
By similar reasoning, facilities in areas with high demand for nursing home beds have little problem filling beds and may therefore maintain lower quality than facilities in low-demand areas. The demand for skilled nursing home beds is measured by the county occupancy rate for nursing home beds, with high demand defined as occupancy greater than 95% and low demand as occupancy less than 83%. County-level nursing facility occupancy rates also serve as proxies for competitive forces in the market, such as the availability of other nursing homes, home health services and assisted living facilities. These measures are supplemented with additional factors that may affect demand. Counties with higher median incomes, or lower poverty levels, would be expected to have higher demand for nursing facility care at any given level of quality.
Finally, more densely populated areas have more potential nursing home residents and should be associated with higher demand.
Endogeneity. An important methodological concern is that the percent Medicare, a key We estimated an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to predict the facility staffing ratio, which is continuous. However, analysis of the number of deficiencies, a count variable, requires a different approach. Negative binomial regression is used in the deficiency analysis because OLS could result in biased coefficients with count data.
If the hypothesis that staffing decreased in response to PPS and increased in response to BBRA is correct, we would expect to see negative coefficients on the interactions between PPS and percent Medicare and positive coefficients on the interactions between BBRA and percent Medicare. Since regulatory deficiencies are a negative measure of quality, we would expect the PPS interactions to be positive and the BBRA interactions to be negative. Furthermore, we would expect the magnitudes of each to be increasing with the percent Medicare in all cases.
Results
PPS has the strongest negative effect on the sum of RN and LPN hours, a measure of professional staffing (see Table 2 ). The PPS interactions are negative, significant, and strictly increasing in magnitude with the percent Medicare. The BBRA effects are positive, mostly significant, and roughly increasing in magnitude. The RN regression shows similar results to the RN+LPN regression except that coefficients at the highest levels of Medicare are less significant and do not conform to the pattern of increasing magnitudes, even changing sign in the case of BBRA effects. The nurse-aide regression shows no significant policy effects from PPS or BBRA.
[TABLES 2, 3, and 4 ABOUT HERE]
The magnitudes of the professional staffing results are substantial. Given a mean ratio of Focusing on the professional staffing regression, the main effect and time trend results indicate an underlying trend toward more professional staffing during the time of PPS and a somewhat weaker decrease during the time of BBRA. The policy effects described above are net of these trends. As expected, facilities with higher percent Medicare at baseline started with higher staffing levels. For-profit facilities exhibited lower staffing at baseline than nonprofits, while hospital-based facilities exhibited higher staffing than freestanding facilities. There was no significant baseline difference for chain vs. freestanding facilities. Other control variables provided results that were largely as expected.
In the negative binomial regression on total number of regulatory deficiencies, the policy effects of PPS are positive, with two out of the four being statistically significant (see Table 3 ).
Magnitudes of the effects increase with the percent Medicare up to the final category. Policy effects of BBRA show mostly negative coefficients, though only one effect is significant and one (for very low Medicare, with a positive sign) is effectively zero. Main effect and time trend variables show that high Medicare facilities differed significantly in baseline numbers of deficiencies from other facilities, and that there appeared to be a general trend toward increasing deficiencies during the course of the study period. Again, other control variables gave expected results.
Magnitudes of the policy effects of PPS and BBRA on the number of deficiencies cannot be read directly from the negative binomial regression results but were calculated from them.
Average predicted values of the dependent variable were calculated with and without the policy effects and subtracted to get estimated marginal effects. Medicaid-only facilities experienced a decline in deficiencies during the time of PPS, while facilities with Medicare experienced and increase; the marginal effect of PPS is therefore defined as the difference between the two changes. The estimated marginal effect of PPS after the full phase-in is an increase in deficiencies of .74 per survey, or about a 14% increase over the mean number of deficiencies (5.4). Under BBRA, the opposite was true: Medicaid-only facilities experienced an increase in deficiencies, while facilities with Medicare experienced a decrease. The estimated marginal effect that we can attribute to BBRA is a decrease in deficiencies of .21 per survey, or about a 4% decrease.
Finally, Table 4 shows the results of the analysis of differential effects on for-profit, chain, and hospital-based facilities. In each case, the entire sample is used in the analysis, and triple interaction terms give the policy effects of interest; only these effects are shown.
Differential effects on a type of facility would be evidenced by a pattern of consistent signs and significant coefficients. No strong pattern is found for any of the three groups. Chain facilities exhibit consistently larger decreases in staffing under PPS and also larger increases under BBRA than freestanding facilities, but the differences are not statistically significant. Hospital-based facilities at lower levels of Medicare exhibit a similar pattern with some significance. would be less able to capture an effect that builds over time.
Discussion
The hypotheses in this analysis -that the prospective payment system and associated Medicare rate cuts would potentially decrease quality of care and that the rate increases under BBRA would potentially increase quality of care -are supported by these results. The results for the PPS interactions suggest that professional staffing has suffered due to the implementation of PPS and the associated rate cuts. Results for the BBRA interactions show evidence of an improvement in professional staffing with the BBRA rate increases, though not as compelling as the evidence for decreases with PPS. There are several reasons why the BBRA results might be weaker. First of all, the funding increase under BBRA was smaller than the funding decrease under PPS, so a smaller effect would be expected. Second, the BBRA rate increases were designed to be temporary. Facility behavior under uncertainty may be expected to be weaker, as they may be hesitant to make permanent changes in staffing. Finally, BBRA was implemented in April of the final year of this analysis, resulting in a short window of only 9 months in which to see an effect.
The analysis of regulatory deficiencies provides only weak evidence that the staffing changes translated into changes in quality as measured by regulatory compliance. Signs of effects were generally as expected, but statistical significance and the pattern of magnitudes were not compelling. One potential reason for the lack of strong results is that deficiencies may be too inexact a proxy for real changes in quality; an analysis of relevant outcomes at a resident level would be necessary in order to make firmer conclusions about effects of Medicare rate changes on residents. Nonetheless, the deficiency results weakly support and do not contradict findings from the staffing results that PPS led to decreased quality and BBRA led to increased quality.
The staffing findings appear to be consistent across types of facilities. No pattern of differential effects was found between for-profits and nonprofits, chain and independent facilities, or hospital-based and freestanding facilities. These findings are consistent with the fact that all facilities must bring in a certain amount of revenue in order to stay in operation; faced with a large funding cut, differences in mission or management may be obscured.
Finally, the magnitudes of effects indicate that the practical significance of these results may also be substantial. Since staffing ratios are low to begin with, even a small effect in absolute terms can mean a large change in percentage terms. As noted earlier, numerous studies have confirmed a direct link between staffing ratios and quality of care, especially professional staffing ratios. Clearly, the evidence presented here suggests that PPS and changes in Medicare rates have a potentially important effect on outcomes of care in nursing homes through the effect on professional staffing.
The study presents some limitations. Under the BBRA, facilities were allowed to move directly to the full federal rate in 2000 if they wished, thereby skipping one or two phases of implementation. It is not known which facilities, or even how many, chose to take that option, resulting in some measurement error in the scaled PPS variable. Since the provision did not take effect until April 2000, it is not expected to affect these results significantly. Another limitation is the use of facility-level, and not resident-level, data. Facility-level data allow for the analysis of staffing, which is central to this paper, but are weak for the purpose of examining residentlevel outcomes. Further research at a resident level would provide more insight into the effects of Medicare rate changes on outcomes of care.
The policy implications of these findings are straightforward. In a nursing home industry that is competitive but relies largely on public funds, payment rates need to be high enough to support a desired level of quality of care. Furthermore, Medicare rates cannot be viewed in terms of the effect on Medicare residents only, as effects may be experienced throughout the facility on all types of residents. Staffing ratios and regulatory compliance affect Medicaid and private-pay residents as well as Medicare residents. A long-term view of quality must look at the entire spectrum of residents and services within the nursing facility.
The policy debate about SNF PPS will continue for some time. This study provides insights into the behavior of nursing facilities when faced with prospective and lower rates for a small but historically profitable proportion of residents. These results could be used to inform the continuing policy debate on adjustments to the SNF PPS system and to anticipate nursing facility behavior in response to future changes. 
